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Abstract
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) such as Skype that enables users to make free
internet-based calls to other users has been seen as a threat to voice revenues by tra-
ditional network operators. While some mobile network operators (MNOs) attempt
to block Skypes entry on their networks, some actually welcome it even if it appar-
ently conicts with their interests in making calling prots. In this paper we develop
a Hotelling-style model of network competition between two MNOs to analyse their
incentives to accommodate or block Skype. We nd that accommodation is the domi-
nant strategy of an MNO whenever its equilibrium voice market share is at least 29%.
Furthermore, the overall Nash equilibium of the game can be either symmetric (where
Skypes entry is either accommodated or blocked by both MNOs) or asymmetric (where
only one has the incentive to accommodate) depending upon the consumerspreference
for a certain network and the quality of Skype-based interconnection. In a symmet-
ric accommodation equilibrium, the MNO with a lower (higher) customer valuation is
better-o¤ (worse-o¤) relative to the one where entry is blocked.
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1 Introduction.
One of the most prominent features of economic development in the last decade has been the
transformation of the telecommunications industry. The shift toward packet-switched tech-
nologies made possible by the digital revolution has made di¤erent transmission technologies
increasingly interchangeable. The impending arrival of internet telephony, often known as the
voice over internet protocol (VoIP) represents the most prominent illustration of this phenom-
enon. By the end of 2004, mobile telephones and more advanced wireless technologies such as
VoIP nally surpassed conventional wireline telephony as the leading platform for providing
voice communications. In particular, Skype - a new VoIP provider that allows its users to
talk to one another for free using the internet, has experienced a phenomenal growth in its
operation since its launch in August 2003. With its ever-increasing popularity and given its
technological specications, Skype is considered by many as a revolutionaryservice that can
potentially threaten the current functioning of the entire telecommunication market.1
In March 2009, Skype rst launched the Skype iPhone Application. Immediately following
its launch on mobiles, several attempts to ban or restrict the use of Skype on mobile phones
were made by several mobile network operators (MNOs) such as AT&T, Deutsche Telekom,
T-mobile UK and T-mobile Germany. At the same time however some network carriers such
as 3 in Britain, Austria, Ireland and Denmark accommodated Skype over their networks.
There seems to be two sides to this story. Those MNOs that attempted to block or restrict
the use of Skype2 on their networks did so for the fear of loss of their calling prots as the
introduction of Skype on mobile phones enables mobile users to bypass the MNO altogether.
On the other hand, some MNOs welcomed it not only for strategic reasons but perhaps
also due to the regulatory pressure from the government. In the former case, even though
accommodation of Skype seems to conict with MNOsinterests in making calling prots, by
doing so, the network operators could actually provide better and diverse services to attract
more subscriptions (possibly from their rivals) and thereby increase their overall prots. In
the latter case also, recent regulatory measures to control prices have lowered the mobile
termination rates substantially with obvious implications for MNOs overall prots. It is
therefore not unusual for the MNOs to look for other ways to increase their prots such as
partnering with VoIPs to increase customer base.
1See Goncalves and Ribiero (2005) for an overview of Skype in the context of the European regulatory
framework.
2For example, in Germany T-mobile and Vodaphone do not completely block Skype but impose considerable
fees for the use of Skype on their network to undermine Skypes attraction.
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Driven by the above phenomenon, the objective of this paper is to analyse under what
conditions MNOs will have incentives to accommodate or block Skypes entry into the mobile
telephony market. To examine this, we consider a three-stage game between two competing
MNOs as follows: in the rst stage, the networks decide whether to accommodate Skype on
their networks or not; in the second stage MNOs compete against each other
n
a la Hotelling
choosing their pricing strategies based on their anticipated network market shares. The market
shares get determined as consumers decide which network to subscribe to. Then, in the third
stage, consumers decide whether to use Skype or voice to make a call conditional on the
availability of Skype on that network. This determines the voice market share of an MNO.
Following La¤ont, Rey and Tirole [1998 (a), (b)] we assume that the networks are vertically
and horizontally di¤erentiated from the customerspoint of view. We solve the entire game
backwards starting with consumersdecisions about using Skype.
Several interesting results emerge. First of all we nd that if a network accommodates
Skype then it engages in a two-part pricing strategy whereby it sets a calling price equal to its
marginal cost for the voice callers and sets a xed fee that is directly proportional to its network
market share for all of its subscribers i.e. for both voice-callers and Skype-users (proposition
1). This is because, as shown in proposition 5, an MNO has an incentive to accommodate
Skype only if by doing so it can still maintain a voice market share of at least about 29%, if not
then it will block Skypes entry in its network. In order to ensure a voice market share of at
least 29%, the MNO attempts to make voice calling as attractive as possible by setting a calling
price as low as possible which results in setting a calling price equal to its (total) marginal cost.
It then sets a xed fee that is directly proportional to its subscription market shares in order to
extract rents from all of its network subscribers as otherwise it would make a loss on its overall
prots. In contrast, if an MNO blocks Skypes entry altogether then network subscribers do
not have any other alternatives except for making only voice calls. If so, then there is no
need for the network to use a two-part tari¤ and therefore it sets an above-marginal-cost
uniform calling price for its subscribers (proposition 2). We nd that there can be di¤erent
possible equilibrium outcomes for the overall entry game that can be either symmetric where
both MNOs can accommodate or block Skypes entry; or asymmetric where one MNO has
the incentive to accommodate while the other does not. Which equilibrium will prevail at
the end depends very much upon customerspreference for a certain network (the vertical
di¤erentiation parameter) as well as on the quality of Skype-based interconnection as we
show that equilibrium voice market shares are functions of parameters of consumersintrinsic
preference for a certain network and the quality of Skype-based calls. Further, we show in
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proposition 6 that in the symmetric accommodationequilibrium (where both networks allow
Skypes entry), the MNO with a lower customer valuation parameter is better-o¤ compared
to the symmetric equilibrium where both MNOs block Skypes entry; whilst the MNO with
a higher customer valuation parameter is actually made worse-o¤ . If on the other hand, the
MNOs are not vertically di¤erentiated with respect to the customerspreference parameters,
then they both are equally well-o¤ in either equilibrium as they each then earn standard
Hotelling prot.
We believe our results resemble some of the phenomenon that are observed in the real-world
network competition. For example, the customer valuation parameter can be interpreted as
an indicator of a rms reputation e.g. higher customer valuation parameter being associated
with a more established network. Our result that smaller networks are better-o¤ in an
accommodation equilibrium (relative to the blockequilibrium) is reminiscent of the situation
when 3 unilaterally accommodated Skype on its network and thereby increased its payo¤.
Similarly, the fact that many MNOs attempted to ban or restrict Skypes usage on their
network can be explained in terms of their fear of losing the voice market shares below a
certain the threshold level as we have shown in this paper.
There is a substantial literature on network competition with regulatory issues (see e.g.
La¤ont and Tirole (1994, 1996), Peitz, Valletti, and Wright (2004), Armstrong (1998), (2002)
among others). The papers that consider competition with VoIP are by Foros and Hansen
(2001) and De Bijl and Peitz (2009). Foros and Hansen (2001) considers competition amongst
internet service providers where the ISPs have incentives to strategically degrade the inter-
connection quality. De Bijl and Peitz (2009) analyses the e¤ect of access regulation and retail
price regulation of PSTN networks on the adoption of a new technology in the form of VoIP.
However, we are not aware of any papers that deal with VoIP entry issues in the context of a
mobile network market in a similar spirit to ours.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 lays out the basic framework of our model.
In subsection 2.1, we analyse consumersdecision about using Skype determining the voice
market share of an MNO. In subsection 2.2, we determine the market shares and pricing
strategies of an MNO corresponding to cases where both or only one of the networks or neither
accommodate Skype. We then determine the equilibrium values of network market shares,
prices, xed fees, and prots corresponding to each of the scenarios. In the subsection 2.3, we
analyse MNOs incentives to accommodate or block Skypes entry and determine conditions for
the overall Nash equilibrium of the entry game. Section 3 provides some concluding remarks.
The appendix presented in section 4 contains some of the proofs.
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2 The model.
Consider a mobile telecommunication model where mobile networks are di¤erentiated
n
a la
Hotelling (1929). The preferences of the consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed
with density 1 on a segment [0,1]. There are two mobile network operators henceforth denoted
by MNOi; i = 1; 2 who are located at the extremities of the segment namely at s1 = 0 and
s2 = 1 where si is the addressof network i.3 We assume that the MNOs are symmetric
with respect to their cost structures and each incurs a total marginal cost of c per call which
incudes costs associated with originating and terminating a call (as well as any other costs
in between).4 We assume that customers have unit demands for calls. The MNOi charges a
price pi per unit of a call (usage fee) and in addition can charge a xed fee Fi for using the
network. Net utility of a customer located at s connected to network i is therefore
Ui = vi   xjs  sij   pi   Fi i = 1; 2
where vi denotes the xed advantage of being connected to network i, x is the (horizontal)
product di¤erentiation parameter between two networks, and xjs sij represents the disutility
from not being connected to the most preferred network type (similar to the transportation
costs in a standard Hotelling model). Let v = v1   v2. Hence v = 0 implies that there is
no vertical di¤erentiation whilst v 6= 0 implies that network services are vertically di¤eren-
tiated.5 We make the following assumption about vi:
Assumption 1. The xed utility vi is su¢ ciently large such that each customer always prefers
to connect to a certain network.
The above assumption ensures that each of the consumer, located in the segment [0, 1],
value the service su¢ ciently high such that they always prefer to subscribe to one network or
the other.
In this paper, we consider the possibility of entry by Skype, a VoIP (Voice over Internet
Protocol) into the mobile market, that enables users to make free internet-based calls to other
users. Each MNO therefore has a decision to make: whether to accommodate Skype on their
network or not. There are both advantages and disadvantages of accommodating Skype. On
3This is not to be confused with the network market share si; i = 1; 2; that we will introduce shortly and
use throughout the paper i.e. supercsripts denote the address while subscripts denote the market share.
4In addition, serving a customer may involve a xed cost f  0. However, we set this xed cost to zero for
the moment as it will not change our analysis.
5Implications of v being positive or negative are explored in the sections below.
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one hand, accommodating Skype implies foregoing calling prot that the MNO could have
otherwise earned as using Skype to make calls is free for customers whereas voice calls are not
(a disadvantage). On the other hand, by accommodating Skype on its network, an MNO can
diversify its services and (potentially) increase its customer base thereby making more prots
as the possibility of using Skype to make free internet based calls can be quite attractive to
the customers (an advantage).
Given that the quality of Skype-based calls is usually lower than that for voice calls, we
denote by parameter ; 1 >  > 0; the quality of Skype-based interconnection. Thus  < 1
means that the quality of Skype calls are always inferior to that made on voice where (1 - )
measures the extent by which Skype calls are inferior to voice calls. When  ! 1, the quality
of a call made via Skype is almost as good as the voice one.6 The quality parameter  directly
a¤ects a consumers xed utility vi when using Skype on network i (see equation (1)).
Once a consumer has subscribed to the mobile network i, the customerspreference for
using voice versus Skype is assumed to be uniformly distributed with density 1 on a line
segment of unit length where MNOi is located at the end 0and Skype at the end 1 on the
voice-Skype segment. See Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Thus a typical consumer has two decisions to make that are inter-connected: She needs
to decide which MNO to subscribe to, and then decide whether to use Skype or voice to
make calls on that network. Obviously, a consumers decision to choose a certain network
is inuenced not only by that networks prices but also whether she can use Skype on that
network. MNOs know that consumers are going to behave this way. Thus the MNOs also
have two decisions to make that are inter-connected: rst they need to decide whether to
accommodate Skype into their networks or not, and then they choose their pricing strategies
based on their anticipated market shares (for both voice and network) that are determined
by consumersdemands for a certain network and voice calls. Obviously MNOssecond stage
pricing strategies inuence their rst stage decision of whether to accommodate Skypes entry
and vice versa.
The timing of the above game therefore is as follows:
 Stage 1: MNOi decides whether to accommodate or block Skypes entry into its network.
6We assume  to be strictly positive and interpret  = 0 implies such bad Skype connection that consumers
will not like to use Skype at all!
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 Stage 2: Given its decision in stage 1, MNOi chooses its pi and Fi (if any) in stage 2.
Given the price vector chosen by MNOi and the location preference s 2 (0; 1) of the
consumer, consumers decide which network to subscribe to that consequently determines
the market share of MNOi.
 Stage 3: Once the customer has chosen to join a certain network, she has to decide
whether to use Skype or voice to make a call (if of course Skype is available on that
network).
2.1 Stage 3: Consumersdecision about using Skype
Suppose an MNOi has accommodated Skype into its network. Then a customer located at
address i; i 2 [0; 1] on the voice-Skype segment for network i; measured from network is
location (i.e. at point 0), chooses to make a voice call whenever Ui  Vi;s where Vi;s, the net
utility of the customer from making a Skype call on the network i; is given by
Vi;s = vi   y(1  i)  xjs  sij   Fi i = 1; 2 (1)
where y represents the degree of substitution between the voice call and the Skype call
(equivalent to the transportation costin a standard Hotelling model). The term vi reects
the fact that using Skype calls reduces a callers xed utility depending upon the magnitude
of . Availability of Skype on network i implies that the net utility of a customer is now given
by
Ui = vi   yi   xjs  sij   pi   Fi i = 1; 2 (2)
The market share i for the voice call for MNOi is therefore determined by solving the
marginal condition Ui = Vi;s: Hence for the MNOi, the market shares for the voice (i) and
Skype (1  i) calls are respectively given by
i =
1
2
+
1
2y
[vi(1  )  pi]; and (3)
(1  i) = 1
2
  1
2y
[vi(1  )  pi]
Thus, higher the calling price pi; lower is the MNOis voice market share. Further, its market
share for voice is inuenced by the quality of Skype calls as shown by the following observation.
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Observation 1 As the quality of Skype-based calls increases, MNOis market share for the
voice decreases i.e.@i=@ < 0:
Proof. Follows immediately as @i=@ =  vi=2y < 0:
The above result is quite intuitive: as the quality of Skype calls increases and gets closer
to the voice-based calls, Vi;s increases and customers naturally prefer Skype to make calls
as using Skype to make calls is free. So the voice market share of MNOi declines. In the
extreme case when the quality of the Skype call is almost as good as the voice call, network
i can maintain a positive market share only by pricing its call su¢ ciently low (i.e. below y)
in order to retain some customers. We make the following assumption to ensure reasonable
equilibrium values of voice market share for the overall game.
Assumption 2. y > c; and y  max vi   c; i = 1; 2:
Finally note that above are expressions for the market shares for the voice and Skype
if Skypes entry into network i has been accommodated. If however, the MNOi has blocked
Skypes entry, then the consumers do not have the option to make a decision about using
Skype implying that the market shares for the voice and Skype by default will be i = 1 and
(1-i) = 0 respectively.
2.2 Stage 2. Network market share and price competition
In this stage, the MNOs decide on their calling prices and xed fees based on anticipated
values of their market shares si in Hotelling style. Now, the demand and hence the network
market share of MNOi is directly a¤ected by whether the customers are able to use Skype
on its network or not and therefore by its voice market share in stage 3, which of course is
conditional on the MNO0is decision to accommodate Skype in stage 1. Denote the network
market share of MNOi by si; i = 1; 2: The MNOs then incorporate these (anticipated) market
shares si into their prot maximisation problem to decide on its pricing strategy. We determine
market shares and pricing strategies in turn as follows.
 Market share of an MNO: If MNOi has accommodated Skype into its network,
then the consumers expected utility from joining MNOi is given by
EUi =
Z i
0
[vi   y   pi]d +
Z 1
i
[vi   y(1  )]d   xsi   Fi
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where  is the preference distribution parameter of the consumer. Thus the above expected
utility now has a slightly di¤erent specication from that given by (2).The rst term in the
above expression represents the expected utility derived from making voice calls whereas the
second term represents the expected utility derived from making Skype calls. Note that the
two networksmarket shares are s1 = s and s2 = (1 s) since both networks have full coverage.
 Market shares when both MNOs accommodate Skype.
If both MNOs have accommodated Skype into their networks, then market share s1 for
MNO1 is determined by the indi¤erence condition: EU1 = EU2 i.e.Z 1
0
[v1   y   p1]d +
Z 1
1
[v1   y(1  )]d   xs  F1 =Z 2
0
[v2   y   p2]d +
Z 1
2
[v2   y(1  )]d   x(1  s)  F2
which yields, after simplication, the following value of s :
s1 = s =
1
2
+
1
2x
[v + y
 
21   22

+ (F2   F1)] (4)
and so the market share of MNO2 is given by
s2 = 1  s = 1
2
  1
2x
[v + y
 
21   22

+ (F2   F1)] (5)
The above equations show how an MNOs market share is inuenced by its pricing strate-
gies: whilst xed fee Fi directly reduces network is market share, the calling price pi impacts
its market share indirectly by altering the demand for its voice calls i.e. by impacting its voice
market share i.
 Market shares when both MNOs block Skypes entry.
If both MNOs have blocked Skypes entry into their networks then consumers have no
other options than using the network to make voice calls) 1 = 2 = 1: Market shares s and
(1  s) are then simply obtained by solving the following indi¤erence condition:
v1   xs  p1   F1 = v2   x(1  s)  p2   F2
) s1 = 1
2
+
1
2x
[(v + (p2   p1) + (F2   F1)] and (6)
s2 =
1
2
  1
2x
[(v + (p2   p1) + (F2   F1)] (7)
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Obviously, in this case, prices and xed fees a¤ect network market shares directly.
 Market shares when one MNO accommodates Skype while the other blocks.
Suppose MNO1 accommodates Skype whilst MNO2 blocks it so that 2 = 1 whilst 1 =
1
2
+ 1
2y
[v1(1  )  p1]: In that case, the markets shares are obtained by solving the following
marginal condition:Z 1
0
[v1   y   p1]d +
Z 1
1
[v1   y(1  )]d   xs  F1 = v2   x(1  s)  p2   F2
so that the following are the expressions for market shares:
s1 = s =
1
2
+
1
2x
[v1   v2 + y21  
y
2
+ F2   F1 + p2] (8)
s2 = 1  s = 1
2
+
1
2x
[v2   v1   y21 +
y
2
+ F1   F2   p2] (9)
Similarly, if MNO1 blocks Skypes entry while MNO2 accommodates it, then by symmetry,
the market shares will be as follows:
s1 = s =
1
2
+
1
2x
[v1   v2   y22 +
y
2
+ F2   F1   p1] (10)
s2 = 1  s = 1
2
+
1
2x
[v2   v1 + y22  
y
2
+ F1   F2 + p1] (11)
2.2.1 Pricing strategies
Given the above market shares, the network i chooses pi and (possibly) Fi to maximise its
prots. Since the prot expressions will di¤er depending upon whether the network has
accommodated Skype or not, we consider each of these cases separately.
 Pricing strategies of network i when it accommodates Skypes entry.
Consider the prot maximisation problem for MNOi: MNO0is prot is
i = si[(pi   c)i + Fi] i = 1; 2
where i is given by (3) and si is given either by equation (4) or (8) depending upon what
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the other MNO does. MNO0is problem is to
max
pi;Fi
si[(pi   c)i + Fi]
The rst order conditions are:
@i
@pi
= si[(pi   c)@i
@pi
+ i] + [(pi   c)i + Fi]@si
@pi
= 0 (12)
and
@i
@Fi
= si + [(pi   c)i + Fi] @si
@Fi
= 0 (13)
Proposition 1 summarises pricing strategies of MNOi:
Proposition 1 When an MNO accommodates Skype into its network, it practises a two-part
pricing policy whereby it sets its calling price equal to the (total) marginal cost i.e. pi = c,
and sets a xed fee Fi which is directly proportional to the network market share si such that
Fi = 2xsi.
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 1 says when a network accommodates Skype into its network, it engages in
a two-part pricing strategy whereby it sets its calling price pi equal to the (total) marginal
cost and then uses a xed fee to extract as much surplus as possible where the magnitude of
xed fee it sets is directly proportional to its (network) market share si: Thus when the MNO
makes its service attractive to customers by allowing Skype on its network, it simply charges
a at fee to all its customers for the network service. At the same time, the MNO attempts to
make voice calls attractive for its customers, by charging as low a price as possible and hence
sets pi = c: The ability to set Fi at a certain level however depends on how its market share
si is a¤ected by Skype accommodation which on the other hand is sensitive to the quality
of Skype calls  and consumerspreference parameter vi (see the analysis in the section on
equilibrium).
Remark 1. With the above pricing strategy, MNOis equilibrium voice market share is given
by i =
1
2
+ 1
2y
[vi(1  )  c]:
Remark 2 As long as v1 6= v2 (i.e. v 6= 0), 1 6= 2; and 1 ? 2 according as v1 ? v2:
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It follows from above that, given  < 1; network i will have larger voice market share than
the other network whenever consumers derive more satisfaction from subscribing to it. One
can, for example, interpret higher value of v being associated with the networks reputation
e.g. a more established network is more likely to generate a higher value of v whereas a
relatively new(into the market) network is likely to give rise to a lower value of v.
Henceforth, to save on notation, the equilibrium values of voice market shares will simply
be denoted by i:
 Pricing strategies of network i when it blocks Skypes entry.
If MNOi has blocked Skypes entry then its voice market share i equals 1, and so the
prot maximisation problem of MNOi is now
max
pi;Fi
i = si[(pi   c) + Fi]
where si is given by equations (6) or (10) [or (11)] depending upon which rm we are consid-
ering. The rst order conditions therefore are:
@i
@pi
= si + [(pi   c) + Fi]@si
@pi
= 0 (14)
and
@i
@Fi
= si + [(pi   c) + Fi] @si
@Fi
= 0 (15)
Proposition 2 When an MNO blocks Skypes entry into its network, it adopts a uniform
pricing policy whereby it sets a calling price above the (total) marginal cost such that epi =
c+ 2xsi.
Proof. First note from equations (10), (11) and (6) that @si
@Fi
= @si
@pi
=  1=2x < 0: Therefore,
equations (14) and (15) are exactly identical implying that there is practically no di¤erence
between pi and Fi; as they both serve exactly the same purpose ) any xed fee is as if
included within pi: If so, then denote that uniform price by epi:The FOCs (as given by equations
(14) or (15)) then imply epi = c+ 2xsi
The second order conditions are satised since @
2si
@p2i
= @
2si
@F 2i
=  1=x < 0:
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Note that given that these market shares are (strictly) positive, an MNO prices its calls
above the marginal costs where how high it can set its price is directly proportional to its
(equilibrium) network market shares. In equilibrium, network market shares si on the other
hand will be determined depending upon the above pricing strategies of both MNOs. Given
that all network users can only make voice calls when an MNO blocks Skypes entry, there is
no need to set a separate xed fee in order to extract surplus from non-voice users in contrary
to the entry accommodation case. Whilst the second term 2xsi in the price expression is
similar to the expression for xed fee in the accommodation case, the main di¤erence though
is that the price epi is now paid by all network i users, whereas under the accommodation case,
the Skype users pay only the xed fee 2xsi:However, given that the values of market shares
will be di¤erent under di¤erent situations, these values themselves will be di¤erent as we shall
see below.
 Equilibrium
Given the above pricing strategies, there are now four possible equilibrium congurations
corresponding to cases where (a) both accommodate; (b) both block, and (c) two cases where
one MNO accommodates whilst the other blocks. We analyse each of these cases in turn.
Case (a) - Both MNOs accommodate Skypes entry into their networks.
Note, in this case whilst the equilibrium calling price for both MNOs are: p1 = p

2 =
c; the equilibrium values of market shares and hence xed fees will generally be di¤erent
depending upon the exogenous parameter values of vi where v = v1  v2:We will analyse the
implications of v being zero, positive or negative reecting the consumerspreference for a
certain network, shortly.
 Equilibrium network market shares si :
Substituting for Fi = 2xsi in equations (4) and (5) and simplifying, we obtain the following
equilibrium values of the market shares:
s1 = s
 =
1
2
+
1
6x
[v + y
 
21   22

] and
s2 = 1  s =
1
2
  1
6x
[v + y
 
21   22

]
where i = 12 +
1
2y
[vi(1  )  c]; i = 1; 2 is the equilibrium value (i.e. i ):
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 Equilibrium values of xed fees F i :
Equilibrium values of the xed fees are given by
F 1 = x+
1
3
[v + y
 
21   22

] and
F 2 = x 
1
3
[v + y
 
21   22

]
 Equilibrium values of network prots i :
Network prots are now i = s

iF

i as p

i = c: Hence the equilibrium prots are:
1jA;A =
1
18x
[3x+ fv + y  21   22g]2 and
2jA;A =
1
18x
[3x  fv + y  21   22g]2
where the subscripts (A;A) denote networksprots when both accommodate.
Remark 3. v > (<)0 then implies s1 > (<) s

2; F

1 > (<) F

2 and 

1jA;A > (<) 2jA;A
whereas when v = 0, both networks split the market equally i.e. s1 = s

2 = 1=2 and
earn Hotelling prot x=2:
E¤ect of .
When the quality of Skype calls increases, voice market shares for both MNOs decline
(see observation 1). However whether this implies an increase or decrease in si of an MNO
depends very much on how the decline in the voice market share of the rival rm a¤ects the
network market share of this rm as si is a function of both 1 and 2: Interestingly, as the
proposition below shows, how this two opposing e¤ects play out depends to a large extent on
whether consumers have any intrinsic preference for a certain network.
Proposition 3 There exists a b (= 1   2y+c
v1+v2
) such that (i) when v1 > v2; @F1=@  0;
@s1=@  0; @1=@  0 for   b whilst @ F1=@  0; @s1=@  0; @1=@  0 for   b;
whereas (ii) when v1 < v2; the opposite holds.
Proof: See the appendix.
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The above proposition illustrates that when an MNO accommodates Skype, the e¤ect of
change of the quality parameter  on the MNOsmarket shares, prices, and prots can be
ambiguous: an MNO is able to increase its network market share and set higher xed fee
thereby making more prots only if the initial quality of Skype connection is higher than a
certain threshold level provided its customer valuation is higher than its rivals. This happens
due to opposing e¤ects - direct and indirect. On one hand, an increase in the quality of Skype
connection reduces the networks own voice market share (the direct e¤ect); on the other hand,
higher Skype quality helps the present network to attract more customers away from its rival
(the indirect/strategic e¤ect). If the latter e¤ect dominates the former then the market share
and prots will increase unambiguously. But if the former dominates the latter, then they
will decrease. Whether the latter e¤ect dominates the former however depends ultimately on
consumerspreference for a certain network as increase in  implies that the quality of Skype
connection is improved on both networks: if consumers prefer network 1 more over network 2
(i.e. if v1 > v2) then the consumers would rather make Skype calls on their preferred network
implying an increase in the networks market share and prots.
One implication of the proposition then is that MNOs may have incentives to invest in
the quality of Skype-based interconnection (for example by improving its own quality with a
spill-over e¤ect on Skype-based connection) in order to raise prots if it accommodates this
VoIP.
Case (b): Both MNOs block Skypes entry into their networks.
In this case, i = 1 for both and the prices are given by epi = c+ 2xsi ; i = 1; 2: Hence the
equilibrium values are as follows:
 Equilibrium network market shares si :
s1 = s
 =
1
2
+
v
6x
and s2 = 1  s =
1
2
  v
6x
 Equilibrium prices epi :
ep1 = c+ x+ v3 and ep2 = c+ x  v3
 Equilibrium values of network prots i : Since networksprots are now given by i =
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si [epi   c], therefore
1jB;B =
(3x+v)2
18x
and 2jB;B =
(3x v)2
18x
where the subscripts (B, B) denote networkprots when both block.
Obviously,  has no e¤ect on equilibrium values as the entry of Skype has been blocked.
Finally, we note that
Observation 2. v > (<) 0 implies s1 > (<) s

2; ep1 > (<) ep2 and 1jB;B > (<) 2jB;B
whereas when v = 0, both networks split the market equally i.e. s1 = s

2 = 1=2 and
earn Hotelling prot = x=2:
Case (c): One network accommodates whilst the other blocks.
There are now two subcases where (i) MNO1 accommodates but MNO2 blocks and (ii)
where MNO1 blocks but MNO2 accommodates. Assume MNOi is the one who accommodates
and MNOj is the one who blocks, where i; j = 1; 2; and i 6= j:Therefore, i = 12 + 12y [vi(1  
)  c], j = 1; pi = c and F i = 2xsi ; and epj = c+ 2xsj : In the following the rst subscript
denotes is strategy and the second j0s: Thus we have:
 Equilibrium network market shares.
si jA, B =
1
2
+
1
6x
[vi   vj + y(i )2  
y
2
+ c] and
sj jB, A =
1
2
+
1
6x
[vj   vi   y(i )2 +
y
2
  c] for i 6= j; i = 1; 2; j = 1; 2
where the rst subscript denotes the MNOs own strategy and the second denotes its
opponents strategy. Equilibrium values of prices and xed fees then follow immediately
by substituting the above values of the market shares into their respective expressions.
 Equilibrium values of network prots i :
If MNOi has accommodated, then
i jA, B = siF i
=
1
18x
[3x+ fvi   vj + y(i )2  
y
2
+ cg]2
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and if MNOj has blocked Skypes entry, then its equilibrium prot will be
j jB, A = sj(epj   c)
=
1
18x
[3x+ fvj   vi   y(i )2 +
y
2
  cg]2
E¤ect of  on MNOis prots.
In this case any increase in the quality of Skype connection unambiguously increases
MNO0is market share and hence its prots via the increase in xed fee as shown by the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 If MNOi accommodates Skype whilst MNOj blocks it, then higher  means
MNOi can increase its market share, charge higher xed fee and thereby increase its prots
i.e. @si=@ > 0; @Fi=@ > 0 and @1=@ > 0:
Proof. Letting i=1 ;and j = 2, @s1
@
= 1
6x
[v1 + 2y1
@1
@
] = 1
6x
[v1   v11] = 16x [v1(1   1)] > 0:
Hence, @Fi=@ = 2x@s1@ > 0 and @1=@ = (F1 + 2x)
@s1
@
> 0:
Thus, in contrary to the result of proposition 3 where the increase or decrease on market
share, xed fees and prots depended upon the initial value of  and customerspreference
for a certain network, here they all increase unambiguously regardless of the value of  and
customerspreference: Given that the rival network has blocked Skypes entry, any increase
in Skype quality directly helps the MNO to attract customers which in turn enables the MNO
to increase its market share, xed fee and prots unambiguously.
2.3 Stage 1: MNOs decisions: To block or not to block?
This is the rst stage of the game where the MNOs need to decide whether or not to block
Skype on their networks, keeping in mind all possible equilibrium congurations as described
above. Given that each network has two (pure) strategies: {accommodate, block}, the game
can be described in a strategic form as follows:
[Insert Figure 2 here]
where player is strategies are {Ai; Big; i = 1; 2; (A: accommodate, B: block). Proposition
5 shows that unilateral accommodation is the dominant strategy of MNOi whenever by doing
so it can maintain a voice market share above a certain threshold level (approximately 29%).
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Proposition 5 MNOi prefers to accommodate Skype regardless of what its rival does, when-
ever its voice market share i  0:29 (approximately) for i = 1; 2.
Proof: See the appendix.
The proposition 5 implies that an MNO will have incentives to accommodate Skype if it
anticipates that through its pricing strategy it will be able to maintain at least a signicant
level of its voice market share i.e. it will not lose its entire network subscription to Skype.
Implications of the proposition 5 are as follows. Since accommodateis the dominant strategy
of both MNOs for i  0:29; i = 1; 2; the Nash equilibrium of the game will be where both
MNOs accommodate7. On the other hand, if i < 0:29 is true for both rms, then the Nash
equilibrium of the game will be where both MNOs block Skypes entry. Thus there can be
two possible symmetric equilibria {A1; A2g; and {B1; B2g: On the other hand, for cases where
1  0:29 > 2; or 2  0:29 > 1 is true, there can be two (asymmetric) Nash equilibria:
{A1; B2g and {B1; A2g respectively.
Corollary If MNOs are not vertically di¤erentiated then only a symmetric equilibrium can
prevail where i jA, A = i jB, B where both earn Hotelling prots.
Proof. If rms are not vertically di¤erentiated then v = 0 ) v1 = v2 and hence 1 = 2
(see remark 2). Given that rms are now completely symmetric, the only possible equilibria
are the symmetric equilibria {A1,A2} or {B1,B2}. However,
i jA, (A) =
1
18x
[3x+ fv + y  21   22 jA;Ag]2
=
1
18x
[3x+ v]2 =
x
2
= i jB, B
The above corollary implies when rms are completely symmetric with respect to vertical
di¤erentiation parameters then it does not matter whether they accommodate or block re-
gardless of the value of i as they make exactly the same Hotelling prot in either case. Hence
any of the equilibrium {A1; A2g or {B1; B2g is possible. If however the rms are vertically
di¤erentiated so that v 6= 0 then i s are di¤erent, and hence depending on the particular
value of i;equilibrium can be any of the four possibilities (see gure 2). Which one of the
7Strictly speaking, there will be mixed strategy equilibrium if the condition holds with strict equality.
However, we focus mainly on pure strategy equilibria.
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four possible outcomes will emerge as the equilibrium outcome therefore depends upon the
magnitudes of  and vi as, given that MNOs are now vertically di¤erentiated, it is mainly the
combination of  and vi that determine whether i = (<) 0.29: for both networks, higher the
value of ; higher would the value of vi be needed in order to maintain i above 0.29 if the
MNOs were to accommodate Skypes entry. Note that even if an MNO accommodates Skypes
entry for strategic reasons, that does not necessarily guarantee that the MNOs will be able to
increase their payo¤s by improving the quality parameter . To see that, for a given vi let 

denote the value of  such that i = 0:29 i.e. 
 = f1   c 0:42y
vi
g: Then i  0:29 whenever
   so that MNOs have the incentives to accommodate Skype. Suppose v > 0: From
Proposition 3, improving Skype connection can help an MNO raise its prots (by attracting
new customers) only if  = b. So if  is such that   b >  then even if the MNO has
incentives to accommodate Skype, it cannot increase its prots by doing so as the quality of
Skype connection is not high enough, although it can if v < 0: Moreover, as the following
proposition shows, even when MNOs accommodate Skype for strategic reasons, so that the
resulting equilibrium is indeed {A1; A2g; they are not necessarily better-o¤ compared to the
{B1; B2g equilibrium. This equilibrium therefore resembles the equilibrium of a classic pris-
onersdilemma game. Proposition 6 shows that the MNO with a higher v is in fact worse-o¤
whereas the MNO with lower v is better-o¤ in the {A1; A2g equilibrium compared to the
{B1; B2g equilibrium.
Proposition 6 For 4v 6= 0; (i) if v1 > v2 then MNO1 is worse-o¤ while MNO2 is better-o¤
in equilibrium by accommodating compared to the equilibrium where they both block; (ii) if
v2 > v1 then MNO1 is better-o¤ while MNO2 is worse-o¤ in equilibrium by accommodating
compared to the equilibrium where they both block.
Proof: See the appendix.
3 Conclusion.
In this paper, we have examined the incentives for mobile network operators to block or
accommodate Skype, a VoIP with a huge popularity as it enables customers to make free
internet-based calls, into mobile networks. We have modelled this as a three-stage game
between two competing networks
n
a la Hotelling where rms rst decide whether to accom-
modate Skype or not and then compete in prices; consumers then decide whether to make
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voice or Skype calls in the third stage of the game. We have shown that unless the MNOs
can maintain a voice market share of at least about 29%, they will not have incentives to ac-
commodate Skype over their networks. Whether they can maintain a voice market share of at
least 29% depends not just on their pricing strategy but more importantly on the consumers
preference parameter for a certain network (measuring the degree of vertical di¤erentiation)
and the quality of Skype-based interconnection. Further, we found that in a symmetric accom-
modation equilibrium, the MNO with a lower customer valuation parameter (i) is better-o¤
relative to the equilibrium where entry is blocked and (ii) can increase its market share and
prot by improving the quality of Skype connection whenever that quality is below a certain
threshold level. This then implies that there maybe an argument for investment in overall
improvement for the quality of internet-based call connection. This, we believe, will have im-
portant policy implications about regulatory measure as not only can this increase consumers
welfare (as internet-based calls are either free or very cheap to make), it can also lower mar-
ket concentration in the telecommunication industries by promoting less established or newer
rms.
Despite the simplicity of our model, we believe our results can explain several real-world
phenomena that took place when Skype rst launched its iPhone application in 2009 and can
provide economic justication as to when and why some MNOs restrict Skypes entry while
some dont. Finally, there are various ways our model can be extended. For example, we have
assumed that the quality parameter  is the same for both rms. A more realistic scenario
would be to consider heterogenous values of  as the quality of connection is likely to di¤er
from one network to another. We have also considered symmetric marginal costs for both
MNOs. Relaxing these assumptions will be useful for future research.
4 Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1. From equation (3), @i
@pi
=  1=2y < 0: From (4) and (8),
@si
@pi
= yi
x
@i
@pi
=   i
2x
< 0; and @si
@Fi
=  1=2x < 0: Equation (13) then implies
si =
1
2x
[(pi   c)i + Fi]
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Substituting the above value of si into equation (12), and simplifying obtain:
1
2x
[(pi   c)i + Fi][(pi   c)@i
@pi
+ i]  [(pi   c)i + Fi] i
2x
= 0
or, (pi   c)@i
@pi
+ i = i ) (pi   c)@i
@pi
= 0
Hence it must be that pi = c as
@i
@pi
=  1=2y < 0
Therefore, in equilibrium
si =
1
2x
Fi ) Fi = 2xsi
The second order conditions for the maximisation problem are:
@2i
@p2i
= 2si
@i
@pi
+ 2
@si
@pi
[(pi   c)@i
@pi
+ i] + [(pi   c)i + Fi]@
2si
@p2i
(i)
and
@2i
@F 2i
= 2
@si
@Fi
+ [(pi   c)i + Fi]@
2si
@F 2i
(ii)
As pi = c; (i) yields
@2i
@p2i
= 2si
@i
@pi
+ 2
@si
@pi
i + Fi
@2si
@p2i
=   1
2xy
Fi   1
x
2i +
1
4xy
Fi
=  1
x
2i  
1
4xy
Fi < 0
and (ii) yields
@2i
@F 2i
=  1=x < 0
Hence the equilibrium exists and is also unique.
Proof of Proposition 3. Straight forward di¤erentiation yields @F1
@
= 1
3
[v + yf21 @1@  
21
22
@2
@
g]: Using i = 12 + 12y [vi(1  )  c]; i = 1; 2 and simplifying obtain,
@F1
@
=
1
3
[v + fv22   v11g]
=
1
3
[v +
1
2
f v + 1
y
[cv   (1  )(v21   v22)]g]
=
v
6
[1 +
1
2y
fc  (1  )(v1 + v2)g]
The critical value b is found by solving @F1
@
= 0 ) b = 1   (2y+c)
v1+v2
: Hence for v > 0; it
follows immediately that for   b; @ F1=@  0; @s1=@  0; @1=@  0 whilst for   b;
@ F1=@  0; @s1=@  0; @1=@  0: It is then easily veried that the opposite holds when
v < 0:
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider network 1. There are two situations to consider.
(i) If MNO2 has accommodated Skype, then MNO1 will accommodate Skype if and only
if 1jA, A  1jB, A; and (ii) if MNO2 has blocked Skype, then MNO1 will accommodate
Skype if and only if 1jA, B  1jB, B: Consider (i) rst. MNO1 accommodates when MNO2
does, whenever the following holds:
1jA, A  1jB, A
Or, whenever the following holds:
1
18x
[3x+ fv + y  21   22 jA;(A)g]2  118x [3x+ fvi   v2   y(2jB;(A))2 + y2   cg]2
Or,
v + y
 
21   22
 jA;(A)  v1   v2   y(2jB;(A))2 + y
2
  c
Now note that equilibrium voice market share i when one or both MNOs accommodate(s)
is same regardless of what its rival has done, i.e. i = 12 +
1
2y
[vi(1   )   c] always. Hence
substituting this in above and simplifying, obtain 1jA, A  1jB, A whenever
y21  v1(1  )  c+
y
2
Now, v1(1   )   c = [21   1]y: Therefore, substituting in above obtain 1jA, A  1jB, A
22
whenever the following holds
21   21 +
1
2
 0
Solving 21   21 + 12 = 0 yields the two roots of 1 = 2
p
2
2
: Given that 1  1; only the
value 1 
p
2
2
is acceptable. Hence, given MNO2 has accommodated, MNO1 will too whenever
1  1 
p
2
2
 0:29.
Now consider the other case (ii): If MNO2 has blocked then MNO1 will accommodate
Skype if and only if 1jA, B  1jB, B: Or, whenever the following holds:
1
18x
[3x+ fv1   v2 + y(1)2  
y
2
+ cg]2  (3x+v)
2
18x
Or, after simplifying, yields the following:
y21  v1(1  )  c+
y
2
which is the same condition as above. Therefore, it is easily veried that in this case too,
MNO1 will accommodate Skype whenever its voice market share 1  0:29: Likewise, it can be
easily veried that MNO2 will accommodate Skype, regardless of what MNO1 does whenever
MNO2s voice market share 2 exceeds 0.29.
Proof of Proposition 6. First of all note when 4v 6= 0, (1   2) = (1 )4v2y which can be
either positive or negative depending upon whether 4v ? 0: When both rms accommodate
(i.e. i  0:29 8i); MNO1 will be better-o¤ in {A1; A2g compared to {B1; B2g if and only if
the following holds:
1jA;A =
1
18x
[3x+ fv + y  21   22g]2  1jB;B = (3x+v)218x i.e. i
v + y
 
21   22
  v or, i¤
y
 
21   22
  (1  )v
or, y(1 + 2)(1   2)  (1  )v
or, (1 + 2)
(1  )4v
2
 (1  )v
Similarly, MNO2 is better-o¤ in {A1; A2g compared to {B1; B2g if and only if the following
holds
2jA;A =
1
18x
[3x  fv + y  21   22g]2  2jB;B = 118x [3x v]2
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or , 4v(1  )  y(1 + 2)(1  )4v
2y
 0
(i) If v1 > v2 so that v > 0; then for MNO1; the condition (1 + 2)
(1 )4v
2
 (1  )v
cannot hold as it implies (1+2)  2 which is not possible since the maximum value of i is
1. Hence, it must be true that 1jA;A  1jB;B i.e. MNO1 is worse-o¤ in the {A1; A2g relative
to {B1; B2g:For MNO2 on the other hand, 4v(1 ) y(1+2) (1 )4v2y  0) 2  (1+2)
which is satised ) 2jA;A  2jB;B i.e. the MNO2 is better-o¤ in the {A1; A2g equilibrium
compared to the {B1; B2g equilibrium.
(ii) If v2 > v1 ) v < 0; then for MNO1, the condition becomes 2  (1 + 2) which
is satised ) 1jA;A  1jB;B: On the other hand, for MNO2, the above inequality implies
(1 + 2)  2 which is not possible to hold ) MNO2 is now worse-o¤.
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